The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State

I. The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State Model
   A. Based on the work of Argentine political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell
      1. Sought to explain Brazil 1964 and Argentina 1966, Argentina 1976, Chile 1973, and Uruguay 1973
      2. These regimes appeared to him to be significantly different from the military regimes of the 1930s and 1940s (Collier “Introduction” 3-9)
   B. Types of political systems
      1. O’Donnell defines types of political systems by
         a. “the structure of the national political (including freedom of electoral competition, freedom of interest associations, and level of oppression); regime,
         b. the class and sectoral composition of the dominant political coalition and
         c. certain crucial public policies (particularly as they relate to the distribution of resources among different class groups and sectors of the economy)” (Collier “B-A Model” 23)
         d. An important question is whether the regime is “incorporating” or “excluding” towards the popular sector (23)
         a. The scope of political competition is limited.
         b. The elite of the primary product-export sector (based on minerals and agricultural products) dominates the state and orients public policy around its needs.
         c. Such states are neither incorporating nor excluding because the popular sector has not yet become politically activated.” (23-24)
         a. While there is considerable variation in the degree to which these systems are competitive and democratic, they are clearly ‘incorporating.’ They are based on a multi-class coalition of urban-industrial interests, including industrial elites and the urban popular sector.
         b. Economic nationalism is a common feature of such systems. The state promotes the initial phase of industrialization oriented around consumer goods.
         c. It does so both directly through support for domestic industry, and indirectly through encouraging the expansion of the domestic market for consumer goods by increasing the income of the popular sector.” (24)
         d. Examples are Perón in Argentina (1946-1955) and Vargas in Brazil (1930-1945, 1950-1954). Lazaro Cárdenas in Mexico 1934-1940 may also be included
4. **“Bureaucratic-Authoritarian.”**
   
   a. These systems are ‘excluding’ and emphatically non-democratic. Central actors in the dominant coalition include high-level technocrats—military and civilian, within and outside the state—working in close association with foreign capital.
   
   b. This new elite eliminates electoral competition and severely controls the political participation of the popular sector.
   
   c. Public policy is centrally concerned with promoting advanced industrialization.” (24)
   
   d. Examples are Brazil post-1964-?, Argentina 1966-1970 and 1976-?, Chile and Uruguay post-1973-?

C. Economic and Social Change

1. O’Donnell attempts to explain the transition from one system to another by the “social and political tensions produced by industrialization and by changes in social structure at both the elite and mass level.” (25)

2. **“Industrialization.”**
   
   a. O’Donnell suggests that different phases of industrialization are linked to political change in part because they alter the economic payoffs to different class groups.
   
   b. The transition to the initial phase of industrialization involving the production of consumer goods is associated with the transition from an oligarchic system to populism.
   
   c. Domestically owned enterprises, often enjoying substantial tariff protection and other forms of state subsidy, begin to produce for an existing local market previously supplied by imported goods.
   
   d. Because industrial production may initially expand rapidly as it seeks to satisfy this newly protected market, this phase of industrialization is often referred to as the ‘easy’ phase of ‘import-substitution.’
   
   e. Tariff protection and state subsidy reduce the pressure for production to be internationally competitive, and the leeway enjoyed by economic and political elites regarding wage policy and other worker benefits may therefore be moderately large.
   
   f. This leeway, combined with the interest of industrialists in expanding working class income in order to enlarge the domestic market for consumer goods, may create an opportunity for an ‘incorporating’ populist coalition.
   
   g. Workers receive important material benefits and support for labor unions as organizations in exchange for their political support, thus strengthening the position of industrialists in relation to the previously dominant export elite. . . .
   
   h. O’Donnell generalizes his findings by noting a broader tendency
toward more open competitive political systems at the intermediate level of industrial modernization in Latin America.” (25-26)

3. “Bureaucratic-authoritarianism derives, according to O’Donnell, from a complex set of reactions to the problems that emerge with the completion of the consumer goods phase of import-substitution.
   a. Once the domestic market for simple manufactured products is satisfied, opportunities for industrial expansion become considerably more limited.
   b. In addition, though the initial phase of industrialization may reduce dependency on imported consumer goods, the cost of importing the intermediate goods and capital equipment needed for the production of consumer goods is high, producing or increasing deficits in the balance of payments, foreign indebtedness, and inflation.
   c. These problems lead to a ‘zero-sum’ economic situation which undermines the multi-class character of the earlier audition.
   d. Policy making elites commonly attempt to shift to more austere ‘orthodox’ developmental policies that de-emphasize distribution to the popular sector. They see a long-term solution in the ‘vertical integration’ or ‘deepening’ of industrialization through domestic manufacture of intermediate and capital goods.
   e. However, the levels of technology, managerial expertise, and capital needed in this phase require large, more efficient, highly capitalized enterprises—often the affiliates of multi-national corporations.
   f. The concern with attracting this type of foreign investment encourages the adoption of orthodox economic policies in order to deal with the economic crisis and to create conditions of long-term economic stability that meet the often exacting requirements imposed by multinational corporations and international lending agencies.” (26-27)

4. “Activation of the Popular Sector.
   a. The increasing political activation of the popular sector which resulted from its growing numerical and economic importance complemented the orientation of the populist coalition and was in fact encouraged through public policies supported by this coalition.
   b. With the completion of the first phase of industrialization and the shift to orthodox economic policies, however, the increasingly powerful popular sector is likely to challenge the new policies.
   c. The result is a gap between demands and performance, widespread strikes, stalemate of the party system, and severe political and economic crisis. The popular sector is in some cases strong
enough to bring a temporary return to the policies of the earlier populist period, and populist and orthodox developmental policies may follow each other in rapid succession as the economic crisis continues.” (27)

5. "Technocratic Roles.
   a. Higher levels of social differentiation which accompany industrialization also lead to a greatly enlarged role of technocrats in society—both in the private sector and in civilian and military bureaucracies in the public sector.
   b. The technocrats have a low level of tolerance for the ongoing political and economic crisis and perceive high levels of popular sector politicization as an obstacle to economic growth.
   c. Within the military, this new technocratic orientation is reflected in what another author has called a ‘new professionalism’ oriented toward active military intervention in political, economic, and social life.
   d. The increasing communication among the military and civilian technocrats and their growing frustration with existing political and economic conditions encourages the emergence of a ‘coup coalition’ that ultimately establishes a repressive ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ system in order to end the political and economic crisis.” (27-28)
II. The Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes

A. “Traditional caudillismo and militarism were a product of societies in which the hacienda and the agrarian or mineral export economy was predominant. By contrast, what strikes us today is precisely the resurgence of authoritarianism in societies which could broadly be described as in a process of ‘modernization.’” (Cardoso 33)

1. The term “bureaucratic” has been used to distinguish the caudillismo of “old Latin American militarism” such as in Paraguay, or family based caudillismo such as Nicaragua. (35)

2. In the B-A state, the state is institutionally controlled by the officer corps as a whole, as distinguished from a single general.

3. The military intervenes to organize the country under the “‘national security’ ideology of modern military doctrine.” (36)
   a. This is possible because of increased professionalization of the military in the second half of the 20th century.

B. Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism as opposed to Fascism

1. “In the first place, Latin American authoritarianism is different from typical forms of fascism because it aspires, above all, to produce apathy among the masses. It fears the mobilization of followers, even if they could be recruited from the middle classes rather than the lower strata of society. In consequence, it dispenses with political parties as organizational links between civil society and the state. The army, as guarantor of the authoritarian order, prefers a ‘technical,’ supportive relationship based on alliances with broad social groups, rather than a relationship based on alliances with broad social groups. Thus bureaucratic-authoritarianism diverges not only from the democratic model of bonds between representatives and electors, but also from Italian and German fascism, in which the mobilization of the party and the use of its extremist members as a repressive force was essential.” (36)

2. The B-A state “does not adopt a corporative form. It does not try to stimulate class organization, to promote a doctrine of organic harmony among social groups, or to establish corporative links among them that could form a base for political domination. Rather, the links between civil society and the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime are achieved through cooptation of individuals and private interests into the system.” (37)
Works Cited